INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the potential future effect of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) on Scottish tourism. In the first part of the paper the literature on FMD and the lessons from previous UK outbreaks and reoccurrence are examined. The economic and social impacts are considered and the Scottish contingency planning approach is examined with reference to the tourism industry. In the second part of the paper the management of crises in tourism is discussed and a cognitive mapping exercise is used to consider two scenarios, a 'suspected' and 'confirmed' outbreak of FMD. Finally, the impact on tourism post-2003 and the policy implications for the national tourism organization (NTO), VisitScotland (VS), are considered.
EMPHASIS ON REOCCURRENCE
FMD is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals (ungulates) and is characterized by the formation of erosions and blisters in the mouth, nose and feet of such animals. FMD does not pose a public health risk, and has only ever been reported to affect humans in exceptionally rare cases. FMD first appeared in the UK in 1839 and there have been numerous epidemics of varying severity since that time. Reoccurrence is the reality of FMD, due to the multiple strains of the disease and the different nature of outbreaks. Key factors will include timing, source, type of animals infected and season of the year. Like many countries throughout the world, in the UK FMD reoccurs with little warning and devastating effect. In the UK, the most recent significant outbreak before 2001 occurred between 1967 and 1968. This was traced to illegal lamb imports from Argentina. The government decided that animal slaughter was the method by which FMD would be best controlled. According to the Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe), in 2001 there were 2364 outbreaks in the UK with in excess of 430,000 livestock being culled. 2 FMD can and does reoccur. It has a history of reoccurrence in the UK and Europe, and lessons can be drawn from recent outbreaks and related contingency plans and reactions. It is notable that between 1929 and 1967 FMD occurred regularly in the UK, with all outbreaks being controlled by slaughter methods. In 1981 FMD reoccurred in the Isle of Wight. Although the outbreak was relatively small in scale and was effectively contained, its origins were perhaps of greatest concern. It was believed to have been wind borne, having originated in France and being carried across the English Channel. 3 Reoccurrence is a global problem, 4 and sources from Korea to Kazakhstan have struggled to contain the elusive FMD virus. In 1997 Taiwan was forced to slaughter 5 million pigs in an outbreak that cost that economy billions of US dollars, yet it was the first outbreak in that country since 1923. Slaughter as opposed to vaccination is the preferred option that is actioned globally. The virus is considered endemic throughout other parts of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Japan. Over the period 2000-2001 FMD was reported in Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Japan, Kuwait, Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. 5 The profile of such outbreaks in world media remains significantly less than that of the UK outbreak, however, since the severity of the UK outbreak is at least a partial by-product of the highly developed domestic livestock trade in the UK.
New strains of FMD have emerged from South Asia since the early 1990s which have resulted in further widespread slaughter in Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece and Iraq. 6 The key response in all such outbreaks has been eradication following early recognition. Such rapid responses and clear implementation of culling has been judged to be the most appropriate method of impact minimization. Appropriate use and control of media and communication are critical elements of the management of such situations.
Later in 2001, a similarly large crisis was to impact on the tourism industry in the form of 9/11. This second major crisis was to affect the tourism industry within months of the UK FMD outbreak. The consequences were equally severe and the ability of the national and regional authorities in the relevant organizations was once more found lacking. Yet it is interesting to note that, in retrospect, the impact on world tourism was surprisingly limited. World tourism remains remarkably resilient to shocks, and the industry has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to rebound quickly after 9/11. • opening up visitor attractions and footpaths; • assistance to businesses affected by the disease; • communicating a clear message to people abroad and at home of the true situation of FMD in the UK. 10 In Scotland, at the initial stages of the outbreak, the Scottish Executive (SE) established an impact assessment group (IAG). The IAG comprised representatives from the Scottish Enterprise Network (SEN), VisitScotland (VS), the Scottish Agricultural College, the employment service and local authorities. These bodies provided up-todate reports to the SE ministerial group, which aided policy-making and provided the basis for recovery and relief of hardship measures. In particular, the SE produced a come-back code to help open up access to areas outside infected areas.
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ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND THE SCOTTISH TOURISM INDUSTRY During the outbreak, tourism enterprises in the countryside were affected to varying degrees, with businesses in some areas reporting a decline in bookings of up to 60 per cent by the middle of 2001. 12 However, the economic impact of FMD had a negligible effect on the Scottish economy at a macro level. Evidence provided by the Scottish Economic Policy Network 13 confirmed that the outbreak caused a drop in the level of Scotland's GDP of only 0.001 per cent. This is equivalent to one penny in every £1000. As the 2001 Foot-and-Mouth Disease: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry report stated:
Although losses to sectors directly affected by the disease were, from a macroeconomic perspective, largely offset by in-creased spending elsewhere, the impact on tourism in affected areas was devastating. Some of that activity was diverted to other UK locations and to consumer spending on unrelated items. This reduced the effect on total output. 14 Furthermore, on a pound-for-pound basis, tourism in rural areas and day trips generates a relatively low contribution to GDP for the Scottish economy. Accordingly the enforced switch in spending from rural tourism and day trips to other types of expenditure assisted in offsetting the negative economic impacts of the outbreak. Consequently, the overall effect on GDP was negligible. 15 This displacement of visitors from rural to urban centres is evidenced in overall visitor numbers to rural visitor attractions for July 2001 (the high season), which were 914,300 compared with 991,800 in July 2000. 16 Conversely, the same survey found that citybased attractions experienced an increase of 5 per cent in visitors for July 2001. In contrast, Dumfries and Galloway evidenced a decrease of 24 per cent in visitors to their attractions. Taken together, these findings further affirm that there appeared to be displacement of visitors during this period from rural to urban locations. However, the impact on affected communities was economically and socially significant.
Scotland's tourism industry was not significantly affected by the outbreak of 2001, but the concern remains that any future outbreak may have a more prolonged and devastating effect.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY
Recent events such as 9/11, SARS, the war in Iraq and BSE paint a picture of the tourism industry as one vulnerable to shocks. Central to this perception is the role of the media in influencing public opinion and perception. 17 The media are clearly seen as very influential when it comes to political and social attitudes. It has long been accepted that public perceptions are shaped by the news media they are exposed to. 18 What is important is developing a paradigm of understanding, 19 based upon the 'certainty of the expected', in which authorities develop policies for coping with disruption. This is important as disasters and crises will always happen. But it is media and their instant availability in a theatre of globalization that have changed the immediacy of communication. People watch disasters and crises as they unfold. Against the sensationalism of media coverage is contrasted the rigorous but slow collection of official statistics in fields such as tourism.
MEDIA INFLUENCE
Both domestic and overseas media chose to depict large areas of rural Scotland and the UK as 'out of bounds', and graphic images of animal slaughter and smouldering carcasses were printed and broadcast worldwide. Misleading media reports had the effect of changing the travel decisions of both domestic and international visitors to Scotland. As the UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport noted, the 'widespread and often unbalanced coverage of the foot and mouth outbreak by British and overseas media has left many potential visitors uncertain about the extent to which the British countryside and its attractions are open'. 20 Emotive and vivid language was used to describe the animal slaughter, and this further increased the anxiety of the public regarding visiting the countryside. Erroneous reportage contributed to the reduced visitor numbers to the UK.
TOWARDS CONTINGENCY PLANNING
In September 2001 Scotland was designated as a provisionally free area of FMD and from this time on several inquiries and reports were undertaken to examine the impacts of the outbreak. These reports have provided valuable advice used by the SE in the creation of Scotland's Foot and Mouth Disease Contingency Plan. 21 This plan lays down the terms of dealing with the 'worst-case scenar-io' should another FMD outbreak occur. The plan is a 'living document' subject to regular review. It is linked to the EU-approved UK Contingency Plan for Great Britain and sits alongside parallel plans for England and Wales. These plans are broadly consistent, reflecting the fact that the State Veterinary Service is a nationwide organization and that strong coordination and communication will be required between the three countries in the event of a disease outbreak. Operational responses and key roles are structured so that the processes established in the document can be realistically implemented. This plan notes:
The commitments established in this Plan seek to recognise the serious effects animal diseases such as FMD can only have on animal welfare, and on the viability of many farms and businesses in the rural economy, and the impact a disease outbreak can have on other sectors. This 'framework' for response can be applied not only for FMD, but also for other contagious animal diseases. The intention is for this to be a 'transferable' process with flexibility to cope with any level of outbreak. The EU Directive on Community Measures for the Control of FMD has a specific requirement for a 'stamping-out' policy to eradicate FMD and this is reflected in the Scottish Contingency Plan. The Scottish plan has been formulated from the operational 'lessons learned' during the 2001 outbreak and uses details from the internal inquiry into the preparedness of the SE's Environment and Rural Affairs Department and its responses to the epidemic. Recognition is also made of the important roles which other stakeholders and key agencies can play, particularly in the realm of communication. In retrospect, this was an important point made by the Royal Society of Edinburgh, together with the recommendation that 'in considering the options for controlling FMD, the SE must take account of the effects of the wider interests of the rural economy and involve the appropriate stakeholders'. 23 Key aspects of the contingency plan from an SE perspective are detailed below.
• Communication -now seen as an important element.
• Access -mixed messages and confusion in respect of countryside access must be avoided, because the countryside is a lot simpler to close than it is to open. It is suggested that the countryside will not close down again.
• Disposal -the appropriate disposal of carcasses will remain an issue. It is notable that pyre burning is not ruled out in Scotland, and the priority here will be to get rid of the carcasses in order to minimize any risk to human and animal health. The removal of carcasses in areas like the Highland and Islands will remain a difficulty since transportation and removal may create logistics issues, thus burning remains the preferred option.
The role of tourism within the plan is acknowledged by the Economic Impact Group, along with other agencies. The role of this group is to advise on relief of hardship and long-term recovery.
COGNITIVE MAPPING WORKSHOP
Based upon these concerns, it was considered worthwhile to 'make sense of' and 'explore' the issues that surround the possibility of a future outbreak of FMD and consider such implications and eventualities that could impact upon tourism. 24 VS organized a threehour workshop that brought together experts in FMD and stakeholders (see Table 1 ) to assess where and how the disease would have impact, for example on rural tourism products.
The aims of the workshop were as follows.
• To ascertain the SE's latest expert opinion on FMD.
• If there were another outbreak of FMD, how would it be different from 2001? • Using scenarios and causality thinking, to understand the consequences and impact on Scottish tourism.
Fundamentally such a workshop would help the facilitators to inform policy recommendations, and would allow for the development of a data paper that captured the latest developments, workshop summary and recommendations for action (for circulation to appropriate officers).
The workshop had two parts. First of all it provided expert opinion, in which the SE veterinary and policy officers presented the facts and policy implications. The second part of the workshop used the principles of a 'Red Indian Chiefs' Council', 25 in which participants were seated in a U-shape manner. This allowed for a structured conversation about the problem and possible implications for the tourism industry. The conversation focused on a number of questions that participants had been primed with before the event.
• • To what extend will animals be slaughtered?
• How do you define a contained problem? • How do you define an uncontained problem?
The workshop used the principles of causality thinking in order to build a model of the problem. Causality thinking 26 provides a range of possible causes and structural relationships to the problem situation which can be used for scenario planning. 27 It uses the principles of cognitive mapping in order to develop scenarios. Cognitive mapping enablers a model builder to capture workshop participants' individual thoughts on FMD, through showing connections of how one idea may lead to another. In fact, a cognitive map is a sign-directed map expressing chains of cause and effect amongst the issues that comprise and relate to the subject, in this case FMD. The theory of cognitive mapping draws upon Kelly's 28 personal construct theory as a process of constructing and eliciting a person's understanding of a problem. Cognitive mapping is a tool that can be used to cope with vast quantities of qualitative data in order to structure and make sense of a problem.
The approach emphasizes equally the importance of discussion and content in order to elicit participants' tacit knowledge through the externalization and socialization of knowledge in group situations. In order to do this, the focus of the workshop draws upon 'skilled behaviour', 29 in which participants can surface knowledge that lies outside immediate consciousness, i.e. 'intuition', 'mood' and 'subconscious'. These concepts are recognized as more important than knowledge that is rational or logical 30 -the world of business and management is not logical, but political and intuitive.
In order to overcome the boundaries of 'reasoning', 31 the facilitator concentrates on dialogue rather than the semantic structure of the model. Conversation is captured using Decision Explorer 32 as a backroom tool. Here, a skilled user of Decision Explorer captures the conversation rather than interacts with participants. This allows the group to concentrate on discourse rather than the physical model. Participants make a full contribution, where the conversation is described as 'full', 'free flowing' and 'reflexive' 33 rather than 'narrow', 'limited' and 'bounded', which is often associated with the bounded reasoned approach. 34 During the workshop the software facilitator captured the conversation. Immediately after the workshop, the paper authors set about interpreting the models and constructing scenarios based upon the emerging themes and issues from the facilitation exercise. Such a process followed the principles of model-building and scenario construction as set out by Eden and Ackermann. 35 These scenarios were further developed over the days immediately following the exercise. The scenarios and consequences were further iterated with workshop participants, in order to go beyond the modellers' own thinking. 36 This brought further reliability and validity to the scenarios. Two 'FMD in tourism' scenarios emerged from the cognitive maps: a suspected FMD case and a confirmed FMD case. FMD on a farm near Perth. Immediately an 8 km movement restriction zone was placed around the farm. Within that area the movement of farm animals was immediately suspended. As the farmer had sold animals at Perth market the previous day, restriction zones were also put in place in Londonderry, Inverness, Banff and Durham, to where sold animals could be traced.
The story was not front-page news, appearing on the inside pages of The Scotsman buried within other stories of the day. Within the restricted zone a five-star resort hotel with an equestrian centre located within that restricted zone voluntarily kept their horses within the boundaries of the property (although there were no legal requirements to do so, as horses are not an FMD-susceptible species).
In fact, as the local area tourist board chairman said, 'We were lucky this did not occur during the summer season, when the local agricultural and Highland shows would have been cancelled. In fact we only had a couple of cancellations. Most people had not heard about the suspected outbreak and those that were in the area suffered only minor inconvenience. ' At the end of the 96-hour period necessary for veterinary testing all of the FMD tests proved negative and matters returned to normal.
When VS's communications strategic adviser received the telephone call warning of a suspected outbreak of FMD the NTO put into preparation stage one of their communications and contingency plans in case the suspected outbreak was confirmed. The plan focused on systematic and standard distribution of information across all areas and was linked to the immediate operation of proactive marketing planning. Further animals were tested in the outer areas of these zones for contamination. A confirmed case was found at Glendivet Safari Park, in which several camels and elephants were infected with FMD and subsequently destroyed. The disease also impacted on the hedgehog population in the infected area. The next nine months saw the disease spread through the north of Scotland, with the Highlands not being declared an FMD-free zone until August 2005.
Media coverage was by now widespread, and particular focus was given to the loss of the more exotic species at the safari park. The Scotsman ran a story to save 'Hannibal the Elephant' which caught the attention of the world's press. This was front-page news across the world.
Once this case was confirmed, appropriate legislation was invoked and animal movement throughout the UK and Northern Ireland was restricted to reduce transmission. The purpose of such measures was to control, contain and wipe out the disease before it spread. These measures were effective in reducing the spread of the disease to other parts of the UK. The FMD 'clusters' around Perth, Banff and Inverness affected tourism in rural Scotland, particularly as Perth and Inverness were seen as gateways to the Highlands. Much of the north of Scotland suffered as a consequence over the next nine months. The economic impact of an outbreak of FMD in the Highlands and the Perthshire area was conservatively calculated to be in the region of £150m for 2005. This impact was greater than 2001 because the Highlands and Perthshire areas have a greater reliance on tourism than many other regions of Scotland.
Other destinations such as Edinburgh and Glasgow consequently saw a rise in tourism that year due to the economics of displacement. City breaks rather than rural holidays increased, and minor increases in coastal visitation occurred in south Scotland. The UK tourist is quite resolute, and to a certain extent the media overplayed the story. VS and other agencies at the onset actioned a number of responses and policies, including the Tourism Emergency Plan. This included www.scotexchange.net/fmd, a website devoted to factual updates on restricted and open areas, and joint action groups (coordinated agencies and quangos operating together across Scotland). The Tourism Emergency Plan also included the appointment of celebrity champions who would act as ambassadors for tourism -the 'champions' related 'appropriate' stories about FMD and the Scottish economy. During the outbreak VS acted as the national voice for tourism in Scotland, emphasizing the message that Scotland was open for business. Post-FMD a number of coordinated initiatives were focused on a recovery strategy for the effected areas.
When VS's strategic communications adviser received a telephone call confirming the outbreak, VS put into preparation stage one of their Tourism Emergency Plan communications and contingency scenarios in case the suspected outbreak was confirmed. Such a plan focused on systematic and standard distribution of information across all areas, proactive marketing planning and the opening of the abovementioned dedicated industry and public websites.
REOCCURRENCE -STRATEGY AND POLICY ISSUES
An FMD reoccurrence in the UK is a realistic scenario. Informal opinion in the Scottish Veterinary Service is that FMD will reoccur, thus 'rehearsal' and testing of contingency planning is vital. Therefore a number of strategic and policy issues are highlighted. Figure 3 Confirmed FMD case FMD, first of all, is an agricultural problem and a tourism issue FMD is a livestock disease and response to it is set out by EU and domestic legislation. Tourism is one of the key economic sectors of the UK and Scotland. It supports 1.9 million jobs in the UK and 9 per cent of total employment in Scotland. 37 FMD is a disease that impacts upon tourism and the rural economy. But the danger is that tourism cannot win the strategic arguments. This situation is directly related to the ability of the tourism industry to lobby and represent its case. As the chief executive of the British Hospitality Association observed, the agricultural industry is well organized, experienced and unified in its approach, unlike the tourism industry. 38 Tourism, due to the size and structure of the industry, does not have a united voice. In such a scenario it is imperative that VS, the lead tourism agency in Scotland, coordinates, plans, lobbies and speaks for the industry. There are times when leadership is essential; these scenarios require VS to be a lead organization.
Tourism representation on the Disease Control Stakeholder Group
Currently VS and other tourism agencies are excluded from the Disease Control Stakeholder Group. 39 This group is responsible for the control and elimination of FMD if an outbreak occurs. Representation is essential in order to bring a tourism influence and enable more effective communication. Such membership puts tourism at the core of the FMD scenarios discussed above.
Communications and contingency planning are essential The scenarios detailed above paint a positive picture of VS as an informed lead participant and primary communication agency in the post-FMD confirmation case. Crucial here is the ability of VS to be able to respond and prepare in case a suspected outbreak was designated as a confirmed case. The last suspected outbreak of FMD in Huntley in the north-east of Scotland on 27 November 2002 demonstrated how the current contingency plan structure excluded VS, since the organization was unaware of the outbreak until it appeared in the media. This point has been acknowledged by the SE Environment and Rural Affairs Department and rectified.
Under such a scenario, VS would have between six and 96 hours in which to respond and organize activities such as a joint action group, websites, codes of behaviour, communication messages, press and public relations management.
Simulation and testing
There is an emergent need to test the communications strategy within VS. Such a simulation would ascertain what the organization would do and how it would react in a crisis, and test the effectiveness of actions.
Positive and clear communication Any UK FMD outbreak would result in a national movement ban on animals. The outbreak may well be small, but the perception and actions of the public and the overseas market would be major. Holidays will be cancelled, deposits lost and large areas of countryside will be avoided. A more developed communications strategy will be vital for both the tourism industry and the potential consumer. Proactive marketing campaigns that emphasize Scotland as 'open for business', thus demystifying myths and rumours, will be a vital form of communication. The importance of correct information is essential for the travel trade, VisitBritian, travel press and tour operators.
Short-term support for effective industry recovery VS in partnership with agencies and stakeholders would develop robust and coordinated financial support and advice for affected business in the short term. Examples of such a systematic approach to financial assistance would include suspension of area tourist board membership fees, reduction in business rates, interest-free loans, targeted marketing support and facilitated EU assistance.
Short-term marketing
Tactical marketing will prioritize those areas of the country that are affected and not receiving tourist visitation. Lessons learned from the 2001 outbreak indicate that leisure activities continued but were displaced from rural to urban and coastal destinations. Area tourist boards and VS should signpost and target areas in order to maximize displacement within Scotland, rather than see tourists go elsewhere. Niche promotion focused on partner facilities and activities that distinguish unaffected products and markets should then see positive displacement effects. Consumers and markets that are unconcerned and are not influenced by FMD should be continually targeted throughout the period.
Medium-to long-term marketing
Medium-term marketing should focus on niche areas and generic campaigns such as 'Autumn Gold' and 'Spring into Summer'. Long-term strategies should focus on recovery in the most affected areas. Over the period of the outbreak and throughout the period of containment and recovery it is essential that VS maintains a market presence in tourism-generating countries and regions. Any withdrawal from key markets would cause long-term repercussions for Scottish tourism. VS would work with partners, providers and other agents in key affected areas in order to bring tourists back to the area once the disease is cleared.
VS would have responsibility for image marketing and brand recovery, targeted to correct misconceptions and misreportage. Selective marketing assistance is also likely to be available for any specific region affected by the disease. Furthermore, additional external assistance may be available from UK and European sources depending the severity of the outbreak.
CONCLUSION
This paper has considered the consequences of a future outbreak of FMD in Scotland and the role and reaction of government agencies. The outbreak in 2001 could be considered minor, as it was on the fringes of the outbreak in the Lake District. But it is important to prepare for what scenario unfolds, as one thing is certain: FMD will reoccur. The history of reoccurrence both in the UK and in other parts of the world suggests contingency planning is both appropriate and necessary. It is clear from a tourism perspective that issues related to communication and the management of crises are a concern. Responses must be focused and flexible and communications must be proactive and joined up between relevant stakeholders.
In both of the potential scenarios examined in this paper the likely consequences for the tourism industry of Scotland were considerable. For effective management, recovery and minimization of economic impact the role of VS merits review and the policy and strategic issues highlighted above merit serious consideration. The most important lesson relates to history, as Hobsbawn 40 reminds one, in that it is the past which will always shape the future -so the lessons learned from 2001 form the basis for tourism contingency planning for the future.
